Machine learning has revolutionized cyber-physical systems (CPS) in multiple industries - in the air, on land, and in the deep sea.
And yet, verifying and assuring the safety of advanced machine learning is difficult because of the following reasons:
Galois seeks to solve these problems with Leveraging Symbolic Representations for Safe and Assured Learning (“Assured Learning”). As part of DARPA’s Assured Autonomy program, Assured Learning aims to develop an assurance framework specifically for CPS systems that rely on machine learning or learning-enabled controllers.
The Assured Learning project is designed to test and verify the safety of cyber-physical systems, but it could also go further. Assured Learning aims to explore the following approaches:
Assured Learning will set a new standard by providing learning-enabled CPS with the ability to learn from mistakes.
Galois and research partners at Purdue University, University of Texas at Austin, Oregon State University, and Rice University have developed a three-part process to explore how such a system can work:
Galois will help design and implement a toolchain that introduces an abstract interpretation training strategy that can train neural networks and make them provably correct.
Inspired by the concept of concolic testing (e.g. a mix of concrete and symbolic), Galois plans to use a symbolic model of the neural network and its environs.
Run-Time Assurance technologies will do two things: monitor software for expected failures and automatically recover from those failures. Galois has chosen a domain-specific language named CoPilot (and co-created with NASA) to develop Run-Time Assurance technologies for this purpose.
Galois believes that Assured Learning can extend assurance to the entire autonomy domain. One day, this could even apply to applications that take humanity to the furthest reaches of space.
This research was developed with funding from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). The views, opinions and/or findings expressed are those of the author and should not be interpreted as representing the official views or policies of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.